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Moore: These are Drugs. These are Drugs Using Guns. Any Questions? An An

THESE ARE DRUGS. THESE ARE DRUGS USING GUNS. ANY
QUESTIONS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIVERSE

APPLICATIONS OF 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario-entirely plausible under current law.
John Jones lives in New York City. His brother James lives in Los Angeles.
Both are cocaine dealers and both own semi-automatic handguns.
One evening, DEA agents in New York and Los Angeles execute search
warrants of the brothers' homes. Each brother is discovered by the agents
conducting a cocaine transaction in an upstairs bedroom. In both cases, the
agents discover drugs hidden among the attic insulation and handguns
concealed in basement closets.
John and James are indicted and both plead guilty to federal drug
trafficking charges. In addition, both men are indicted pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), a federal statute which creates a separate penalty for the
use or carrying of a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking
transaction. Both men receive three year sentences on the drug charges.
However, John is acquitted of the firearms charge by a New York federal
court, but James is found guilty on the same charge by the Los Angeles
federal court. Following his conviction, James receives an additional five
year non-concurrent sentence as mandated by the firearms statute, with no
opportunity for probation or parole.
How could John and James receive different treatment when the circumstances are identical? Simply put, this inequity occurs because the brothers
reside within different circuits of the United States Courts of Appeal, and the
two circuits in question have reached irreconcilable constructions of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any... drug trafficking crime (including a ...

drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced

punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such ...

years.

drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five

1. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (West Supp. 1993). The statute also establishes mandatory sentences for the use
or carrying of certain types of weapons and subsequent convictions (10 year sentence for short-barrelled
rifles and shotguns; 30 years for machine guns, destructive devices or guns equipped with mufflers or
silencers; 20 years for second or subsequent convictions; and life imprisonment without parole for second
convictions for the weapons which trigger the 30-year sentence), and prohibits the court from granting
probation, suspended sentences or concurrent terms of imprisonment.
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The "uses" element of the statute has been subject to varying interpretations by the federal Courts of Appeal, 2 yet it has been construed by the
Supreme Court of the United States only in the context of an exchange of
guns for narcotics.
The majority of the circuits have construed the term "uses" broadly.
According to the majority, the mere presence of firearms at the scene of a
drug arrest will be enough to satisfy the statute because (i) the weapons could
be used to protect the trafficker's drugs, cash, or paraphernalia and (ii) given
the possibility of use, the weapons have in fact been used to create a "drug
fortress". However, a minority of two circuits has interpreted the statute as
requiring that the government prove "ready access"-i.e., that the strategic
placement of the weapons supports an inference that the defendant intended
to use, or would have used, the firearm during the drug trafficking
transaction(s). 4 The intent to use a firearm may not be presumed from the
mere fact that it was found in the same room as drugs and related items .
This Comment will focus on the two irreconcilable rationales applied by
the United States Courts of Appeal to construe the "uses" element of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), with a suggestion to the United States Supreme Court
that the time is ripe to "clarify the meaning and scope of section
924(c)(1)".6 Part I will offer a brief summary of the statute's legislative
history; Part H will illustrate why the "ready access" doctrine is incompatible
with the "drug fortress" approach. Part III will analyze the Supreme Court's
opinion in Smith v. United States7 (with additional focus on Justice Scalia's

2. Michael J.Riordan, Using a Firearmduring and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime:Defining
the Elements of the MandatorySentencing Provision of 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)(1), 30 DUQ. L. REv. 39, 40
(1990).
3. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993) (6-3 decision; O'Connor, J.;
holding that trading gun
for narcotics constitutes "use" of firearm within meaning of statute). Smith's failure to resolve the conflict
among the federal circuits in defining "use" under different factual circumstances is discussed in Part III,
infra.
4. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia
Circuits apply the "drug fortress" theory; the Second and Third apply the "ready access" approach. See
infra Part ll.B. See also United States v. Castro-Lama, 970 F.2d 976 (1st Cir. 1992) (evidence supports
conviction where defendant in car at scene of drug pickup with unloaded gun and cash in locked trunk);
United States v. Nelson, 6 F.2d 1049 (4th Cir. 1993) (conviction affirmed where search pursuant to
warrant revealed guns and drugs in the same rooms, but no actual drug trafficking activity at the time of
the search); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir 1990) (conviction affirmed based on
constructive possession of cocaine and gun; defendant used keys to gain entry to driver's side of car in
which cocaine and gun were found under driver's seat); United States v. Travis, 933 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.
1993) (weapons in locked gun compartment could support conviction even though car not registered to
defendant and no key to glove compartment found on defendant's person); United States v. TorresMedina, 935 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1991) (use requirement satisfied if weapon available to defendant, even
though disabled defendant was physically unable to personally retrieve the weapon); United States v.
Harmon, 996 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1993) (firearm used or carried when it serves as source of protection
for drugs or when it emboldens defendant to commit drug trafficking crime); and United States v. Poole,
878 F.2d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 1989) ("the presence of weapons in a location the defendant used to
distribute a significant quantity of illegal drugs is sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of whether the
defendant used the firearms in connection with a drug trafficking crime").
5. See United States v. Mukes, 1992 WL 3713 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 361, reh 'g denied 113 S.Ct. 833 (1992); United States v. Featherson, 949 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, Langston v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 361 (1992) (White, J.,dissenting).
6. 113 S. Ct. at 362 (White, J.,dissenting).
7. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
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dissent) and demonstrate why the holding of Smith does not resolve the issue
of how the "uses" provision should be construed in cases that do not involve
a guns-for-drugs exchange. The article concludes in Part IV in support of
applying of the "ready access" approach.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is the product of a series
of amendments which reflected Congressional and public concern over the

increasing number of narcotics-related crimes. 8
First enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, section 924(c)
initially created a separate offense for the use or the unlawful carrying of a
firearm "during the commission of any felony." In addition to the penalty
for the underlying felony, the defendant received a separate sentence of not
less than one or more than ten years for each section 924(c) conviction. 9
The statute was first amended as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.10 The new predicate offense was "any crime of violence"
and the word "during" was replaced by the phrase "during and in relation
to. "I,

The predicate offense of drug trafficking was added by a 1986 amendment. 12 It carries the same mandatory penalty as those which were
previously attached to a conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and
in relation to the commission of a violent crime. In comparison to the 1984
amendment, the 1986 revision was more in line with the report issued by the
U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, which recommended
that mandatory prison terms for the use of a firearm attach not only to crimes
of violence but to federal felonies in general. 3 The statute was most
recently amended in 1990 to add (1) a ten-year mandatory sentence if the
firearm is a short-barrelled rifle or shotgun, and (2) the classification
"destructive devices" to the mandatory sentencing provisions applicable to
machine guns. ,4
To successfully prosecute under section 924(c)(1), the government must
prove the defendant's commission of the underlying crime of violence or
drug trafficking offense. 5 Although it is frequently referred to as a
"penalty enhancement" provision, section 924(c)(1) creates an offense that

8. Riordan, supra note 2, at 39.
9. Riordan, supra note 2, at 42 n.18 (citing Comment, Federal Sentencing Enhancement: Mandatory

Penaltiesfor FirearmsUse Under the Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1984, 19 LOy. L.A. L. REV.
823 (1986)).
10. Id. at 41.
11. United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1988).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 27 (1986).

13. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308 § 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N,. (99 Stat.) 1353.
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924 (vest. Supp. 1993).

15. H.R. Rep No. 495, supra note 12, at 9.
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is separate from the underlying violent or drug crimes. 6 For example, if
a defendant is convicted of distinct underlying drug trafficking crimes (such
as the common combination of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute plus (2) possession with intent to distribute) but only a single
firearm is seized, each of the two drug trafficking offenses is a predicate for
a distinct section 924(c)(1) weapons conviction. 7 Under a penalty enhancement scheme, the defendant would only receive one section 924(c)(1)
conviction, with a built-in extension of the mandatory incarceration period.
The number
of convictions is significant in light of federal recidivist
8
statutes.'
Congress intended to ensure that all persons who commit crimes of
violence or drug trafficking offenses 9 receive a non-concurrent mandatory
sentence without possibility of probation or parole. ' The legislative history
of the 1986 amendment fails to guide courts in construing the "uses or
carries" element of the statute when the underlying offense is a drug
trafficking crime. However, the 1984 amendment history (which specifically
addresses Congress' intent concerning "use" of a weapon in connection with
violent crime) strongly suggests that more than the mere proximity of a
firearm to drugs or drug-related activity is required for a section 924(c)(1)
conviction:
...the section was directed at persons who choose to carry a firearm as

an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act... Moreover, the

requirement that the firearm's use or possession be 'in relation to' the

crime would preclude its application in a situation where its presence
played no part in the crime, such as a gun carried in a pocket and never

displayed or referred to in the course of a pugilistic barroom fight.2'

With this background of Congressional intent, we turn our attention to
diverse section 924(c)(1) cases where firearms were found during searches
pursuant to a warrant or incident to the defendant's arrest for a drug
trafficking crime, but were not brandished offensively during or in relation
to a specific drug-related transaction. The discussion will analyze which of
the rationales that federal courts have applied to section 924(c)(1) prosecutions is most consistent with the apparent intent of Congress to preclude
application of the statute in situations where the actual or "constructive"
presence of a firearm plays no part in an attempted or completed drug
trafficking offense.

16. Id. at 10.
17. Riordan, supra note 2, at 54-55.
18. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and (g) (West Supp. 1993).
19. Including those offenses which already had statutorily enhanced sentences for commission with a
dangerous weapon.
20. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
3491 [hereinafter Crime Control Act].
21. Id. at 3492 n.10. (emphasis added); see also Riordan, supra note 2, at 44.
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II. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS

A. The "Ready Access" Doctrine
Appellants who seek to persuade the reviewing court that their convictions were based on evidence that was insufficient to establish the "use"
element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) can most reasonably rely on cases from the
Second, Third, and (to a lesser extent) District of Columribia circuits.
Although more recent decisions by these circuits may be interpreted as
signalling a more expansive interpretation of the "use" provision, the cases
that established the "ready access" doctrine as precedent within each circuit
have not been expressly overturned.'
1. The Second Circuit
A 1988 Second Circuit case, United States v. Feliz-Cordero, represents the proposition that a person can possess a gun without either (i) using
it, or (ii) using it during or in relation to a given crime.24 In Feliz-Cordero,
the Second Circuit held that a search which revealed a loaded handgun in a
dresser drawer in a bedroom which also contained a small quantity of
cocaine, cash, and drug records did not establish that the defendant used or
carried it during or in relation to the drug trafficking offense for which he
was convicted.'
The Second Circuit interpreted each element of the "uses or carries"
provision separately, finding that:
Neither the legislative history of 924(c)(1) nor case law in this circuit
suggest that the term 'carry' should be construed as having any meaning
beyond its literal meaning... [a] person cannot be said to 'carry' a firearm
without at least a showingthat the gun is within reach during the commission of the drug offense.16
The court then created a two-part test for construing the "uses" element:
..[I]n order for possession of a firearm to come within the "uses"
provision of section 924(c), one of the following is required: i) Proof of a
transaction in which the circumstances surrounding the presence of a
firearm suggest that the possessor of the firearm intended to have it
availablefor possible use during the transaction; or ii) The circumstances
surrounding the presence of a firearm in a place where drug transactions
take place suggest that it was strategically located so as to be quickly and

22. See United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666 (2d. Cir 1993), and United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d
902 (3d Cir. 1992).
23. 859 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1988)
24. See United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
25. 859 F.2d at 253-54.
26. Id. at 253.
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easily available for use during such a transaction.27
The Feliz-Cordero court recognized the common connection between
firearms and drug trafficking. However, the court found insufficient
evidence to support the defendant's conviction because "under the circumstances of this case, the intent to use the firearm must be presumed from the
fact that a loaded gun was found in the same room as drug paraphernalia
during the course of a searchpursuantto a warrant."I
The result of Feliz-Corderois that the government must prove how the
circumstances of a particular drug trafficking episode support an inference
that a specific weapon was placed by the defendant so that it would be
readily accessible for use during that transaction. The court's decision seems
to focus on the fact that the government could only offer evidence of one
drug-related activity occurring in the apartment where the gun was found-a
$200 payment of money owed from an earlier drug deal that took place in
a different apartment leased by the defendant's brother.29 The brother's
apartment was located directly above the defendant's, and was the location
used for all of the other transactions that supported the defendant's conviction
for the predicate drug offenses. 0 The court found that "on the evidence
presented, there [was] no basis to conclude that the gun would have been
quickly accessible as needed" during drug transactions that occurred in the
upstairs apartment. 3'
The Second Circuit's holding seven months later in United States v.
Meggett32 could have been viewed as a movement away from the FelizCordero rationale. The Meggett court was persuaded that five loaded
weapons were on hand to protect an apartment used as a storage and
processing point for large quantities of narcotics. 33
However, the Meggett court cited Feliz-Corderoas its guide,'M and took
pains to distinguish the two cases on their facts in upholding the trial court's
jury instruction, which said in part:
The government need not show that the defendant actually carried the
firearm on his possession. It is sufficient if you find that the defendant
transported or conveyed the weapon or had possession of it in the sense
that ata
to exercise control
over it.aiven time he had both thepower and intention

27. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added).

29. Id. at 251-52.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 254.
875 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 29.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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The main factor distinguishing Feliz-Corderoand Meggett was that the
Meggett defendants had placed the weapons (i.e. "used" them) in strategic
locations, as compared to "the absence of proof that the defendants in FelizCordero had placed [their] weapon to have it available for ready use during
[their] transaction." 3 6
Three months after Meggett, in United States v. Alvarado,37 the Second
Circuit found that the presence of (i) a bullet-proof vest and a stash of
cocaine next to a safe containing cash and two loaded handguns and (ii) a
loaded pistol in an unlocked drawer of a desk holding drug packaging
paraphernalia could support a 924(c)(1) conviction. "[lI]mplicitly recognizing
the teaching" 38 of Feliz-Corderoand Meggett the court held:
.. 'use' requires possession of a gun under circumstances where the
weapon is so placed as to be an integral part of the offense... The
evidence here supports the jury finding that the several loaded weapons in
Alverado's apartment were strategically located to protect the substantial
quantities of cocaine that were packaged and sold in the apartment.. .and
to provide added security during drug sales... Thus, unlike Feliz-Cordero,
there was ample proof 'that the defendants... had placed the weapon[s]
to
39
have [them] availablefor ready use during [drug] transaction[s]' .
The Second Circuit has been consistent in applying Meggett and Alverado in
situations where no drugs are found on the defendant's person or at the
location of the arrest for the predicate drug trafficking offense(s).
In United States v. Medina,' the defendant left a gun and spare
ammunition on a table in the bedroom and took $47,000 from the bedroom
to the dining room to give to a government informant believed to be a
cocaine dealer. 4' The court found that the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the gun was strategically placed and readily available to
protect the cash during the transaction,4' even though the defendant's
decision to leave the gun in his bedroom during the transaction made the case
"close. "I
Although a February 1993 case suggests that the Second Circuit is
moving away from the Feliz-Cordero/Meggettready access requirement, the
circumstances of the court's appellate review make such a conclusion
questionable. In United States v. Lindsay,' the Second Circuit of Appeal
reviewed a 924(c)(1) conviction where 5 guns, but no drugs, were found in
the defendant's home. The evidence included: (1) trial testimony where one
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 29. (emphasis added)
882 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 653.
Id. at 653-54 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
944 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 67 (relying on the two-part test enunciated in Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d at 254).
Id.
985 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1993).
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of Lindsay's "drug trafficking associates" stated that Lindsay discharged a
gun with a silencer on an occasion when Lindsay provided him with cocaine,
and another stated that he saw Lindsay fire a rifle with a silencer outside
Lindsay's tavern where cocaine had been stored; and (ii) a silencer recovered
during a search of Lindsay's tavern. 45
The Court found that, on the evidence, "the jury could have concluded
that the five firearms located in Lindsay's house were strategicallyplaced for
use during drug transactions. "I Yet, the court did not expressly overrule
Feliz-Cordero or Meggett, which require the "ready accessibility" of a
weapon during or in relation to a particular drug trafficking offense.
This result is not as surprising as it may seem. Lindsay was reviewed
by a judicial panel which included a District Court Judge from the Central
District of California sitting by designation.47 With the Ninth Circuit firmly
within the "drug fortress" camp with respect to 924(c)(1) prosecutions, it is
conceivable that Judge Kelleher's vote forced this panel to adopt a point of
view that is a minority position within the Second Circuit.
Thus, the Second Circuit's holding in Lindsay should not be viewed as
a departure from the Feliz-Corderodual requirements of strategic location
and ready accessibility. The Second Circuit remains one of the two federal
appellate courts which has not yet abandoned a traditional approach to
construing the "uses" provision of section 924(c)(1).
2. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Theodoropoulos,4 the Third Circuit directly addressed and dismissed the "drug fortress" theory, which is frequently
advanced by the government in section 924(c)(1) prosecutions and is followed
in the majority of the federal circuits. The "drug fortress" approach suggests
that "the mere presence of weapons in the apartment used by the drug
traffickers is sufficient to constitute use ...

[by] increas[ing] the likelihood

that the criminal undertaking would succeed." 49

The Theodoropouloscourt acknowledged that "... the presence in plain
view of a loaded firearm ... is evidence that the conspirators may have felt

some need for security from which a jury could infer that the weapon was

45. Id. at 672.

The evidence also included (1) over $5,000 in cash seized from Lindsay's house,

including $1,500 from his bedroom; (2) testimony that Lindsay conducted his drug-trafficking business
from his home; and (3) testimony that Lindsay used firearms during some of his drug transactions. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added). However, unlike prior 924(c)(1) holdings, the Court of Appeals fails to

specifically discuss precisely where the 5 weapons were found within Lindsay's home, or the proximity
of the weapons to areas of the home where drug transactions were known to have occurred.
47. Id. at 668 (Kelleher, J., sitting by designation).

48. 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1989).
49. Id. at 596 (citing United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 841-43 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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an integral part of the conspiracy and was 'used' therein."5 However, the
court stopped short of permitting an inference of "use" from mere possession.
The court reviewed the legislative history of section 924(c), focusing on
the Senate Report concerning the 1984 amendment which created the "during
and in relation to" language:
[Tihe requirement that the firearm's use or possession be "in relation to"
the crime would preclude its application in a situation where its presence
played no part in the crime, such as a gun carried in a pocket and5never
displayed or referred to in the course of a pugilistic barroom fight. '
The court noted that "in drafting this provision, Congress required either
use or carrying of a firearm"'52 and declined to adopt the position that "the
mere availability of a firearm nearby, as distinguished from its open display,
is equal to use 'in relation' to an offense. 3
The Theodoropoulos rationale still controls section 924(c)(1) appeals in
the Third Circuit, though in 1992 the court broadened the scope of Theodoropoulos in United States v. Hill when it sustained a conviction based on
an unloaded rifle hidden in an unused icebox located immediately next to the
defendant's illegal drugs.'
The court distinguished Hill from Theodoropoulos by focusing on the requirement of ready accessibility. The
Theodoropoulos holding turned on the fact that the government failed to
establish that the defendant had strategically placed his weapons to have easy
means of access during the predicate drug transactions,55 while Hill "simply
had to reach out and open the icebox." 56
Similarly, in United States v. Reyes57, the Third Circuit held that an

unloaded pistol found in a car trunk in a bag with drug money could result
in a section 924(c)(1) conviction because the government established "ready
accessibility" (i.e. the proximity of the weapon to the defendant) via proof
that the defendant had a key to the trunk and a bullet for the gun on his

50. Id. at 596-97 (The Theodoropoulos court adopted the Feliz-Cordero test and found that "[the
presence of a loaded shotgun in plain sight in [the] apartment where it was readily accessible to the
occupants was evidence that the firearm was in use during and in relation to the drug trafficking
conspiracy proven in this case." Id. at 597 (emphasis added)).
51. Id. at 597 (citing S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 314 n.10). See discussion supra, Part
I.
52. Id. at 597.
53. Id.
54. United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding analogous to United States v. Martinez,
919 F.2d 419, 421 (10th Cir. 1990)).
55. The Theodoropoulos court vacated the defendant's §924(c)(1) conviction because the jury did not
specify which of four weapons was used as the basis for the conviction. However in doing so, the court
found that only one shotgun found in the apartment where police had also discovered cocaine could satisfy
the requirements of § 924(c)(1). Three guns found in a trash can on the apartment's back porch were held
to be insufficient to support a § 924(c)(1) conviction. 866 F.2d at 598.
56. 967 F.2d at 907.
57. 930 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1991).
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person at the time of his arrest.5"
Even if Lindsay is seen as the Second Circuit's retreat from the "ready
access" theory, recent Third Circuit section 924(c)(1) opinions show no
movement away from the "ready access" approach. Indeed, the Third
Circuit's approach to these cases has been consistently to require that the
government prove both strategic placement and ready accessibility of
weapons allegedly used during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
B. The "DrugFortress"Theory
The "drug fortress" theory is employed by the majority of United States
Courts of Appeal59 to uphold section 924(c)(1) convictions in situations
where weapons are not found on the person of the defendant but are found
(along with drugs, drug paraphernalia or proceeds of drug trafficking) on
premises under the actual or constructive possession of the defendant."
1. The District of Columbia Circuit
After struggling with the varied constructions of "use" while on the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Justice Clarence Thomas probably
did not hesitate to join Justice Byron White in dissenting against the Supreme
Court's failure to grant certiorari to two section 924(c)(1) appeals." Justice
Thomas wrote the opinion for a key District of Columbia circuit case on this
issue, United States v. Long.62 Additionally, shortly before his appointment
to the Supreme Court, he authored an opinion which broadened the Long
rationale.63
The District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of the "use" provision
can best be described as having evolved into a "modified drug fortress"
approach. In 1990, the court set a minimum threshold in Long for finding
"use" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1): "Evidence of possession, or
evidence from which possession may reasonably be inferred, is a prerequisite
to a conviction for 'use' under 924(c)(1). "I
In Long, a search pursuant to a warrant revealed a working but unloaded
pistol handle protruding from between sofa cushions( i.e. readily accessible),
in an apartment used for "drug related crime" which was visited by Long

58. Id. at 314 n.5.
are discussed herein to exemplify how
59.Section 924(c)(I) cases from the District of Columbia circuit
a "ready access" circuit evolved into a "drug fortress" circuit; and cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
have been selected to represent the drug fortress point of view because these circuits produced the two
cases which were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court in 1992. See supratext accompanying note 5.
60. Riordan, supra note 2, at 47.
61. 113 S.Ct. 361 (1992). See also supra note 5.
62. 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
63. United States v.Harrison, 931 F.2d 65 (D.C.Cir. 1991).
64. 905 F.2d at 1579.
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two to three times per week.65 Considering these facts, the court found
that:
Even assuming [Long] visited the apartment to carry out drug transactions,
there is no evidence that he exercised the degree of dominion and control
over the premises to support an inference of constructive possession over
their contents. . .Upholding the conviction of a defendant inthe absence
of any indica ofpossession would stretch the meaning of "use" beyond the
breaking point.
Citing precedent,67 the Long court articulated a test for determining the
nexus between a defendant and a weapon. The defendant's actual or
constructive possession of a firearm was to be indicated by one or more of
several factors: (1) close proximity to the firearm, (2) possessory interest in
the firearm, or (3) dominion and control over the premises on which the
firearm was located.6
However, subsequent holdings suggest that the Long rationale has been
broadened in cases where "evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict of
'use' [appears] without fitting the technical rubric of possession."69 Justice
7 , for example, holds that a
Thomas' opinion in United States v. Harrison
jury can reasonably find that an unarmed passenger in a van constructively
possessed a weapon found on the persons of his co-defendants because
"...when and if [he] was shot at, he would either use one of his confederates' guns to shoot back, or else instruct one of them to do so. . . in other
words, [he] knew he had 'some appreciable ability to guide the destiny' of
the weapons ...[and] [t]hat is sufficient to establish constructive possession .... 71
One year later, in United States v. Jefferson72 , the District of Columbia
Circuit explained its holding in Long by emphasizing that the only evidence
connecting Long to the gun found in the sofa was his presence in the
apartment.73

In contrast, the court found that Jefferson's statements

acknowledging his possession and use of a gun found in the backyard of his
mother's house (where he also lived) with over seventy grams of crack

65. Id. at 1575-76 n.7.
66. Id. at 1577 n.7.
67. United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defendant lived in apartment and had
keys to bedroom where weapon was found, and had wallet and personal pictures in that bedroom); and
United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (testimony that defendant brought guns with him
from New York established past connection between defendant and weapon).
68. 905 F.2d at 1578.
69. Id. at 1582 (Sentelle, J.,
concurring).
70. 931 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 72-73.
72. 974 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
73. Id. at 206.
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cocaine would support an inference of constructive possession of the
weapon. 74
Nevertheless, despite the holdings in Harrisonand Jefferson, it appears
that the District of Columbia Circuit is not yet willing to completely abandon
the Long rationale that mere presence of weapons and drugs at the same time
does not compel a finding of actual or constructive possession.
2. The Fifth Circuit
On the other hand, other drug fortress circuits have found that the mere
presence of a defendant, a weapon and drugs on the same premises at the
same time, regardless of the physical proximity of one to another, must mean
that the defendant had the general intent to have the weapon available for
possible use during any drug transaction (the first element of the FelizCorderotest). Articulable facts which show the defendant's prior or present
disposition to use weapons in relation to drug trafficking activities are not
needed even in situations where it would be virtually impossible for the
defendant to reach the weapon during a drug transaction gone bad (or an
attack on the "fortress"), for drug fortress courts have in effect construed
section 924 (c)(1) as a strict liability offense. Since the intent provision has
been so broadly construed, it is not necessary for drug fortress circuits to
even reach the issue of whether or not a weapon was strategically located so
as to be readily accessible for use during a drug transaction (the second
element of the Feliz-Corderotest).
For example, in United States v. Robinson,75 a pistol and marijuana
were found together in a boot in the defendant's laundry room, while cocaine
was found in a closet elsewhere in the house. The jury used the defendant's
conviction for possessing the cocaine with intent to distribute as the predicate
drug trafficking offense which supported his section 924(c)(1) conviction for
the pistol. 76
The Fifth Circuit failed to articulate specific evidence to support the
jury's finding that Robinson intended to use the pistol during a cocaine
transaction, and that he strategically placed the gun in the basement to "use"
in relation to drug transactions occurring elsewhere in the house. Yet, the
Fifth Circuit announced that a jury "could reasonably have concluded that
74. Id. During custodial interrogation, Jefferson made the following statement: "Mike gave me the gun
to hold so in case we ever got in trouble, we could use it to keep them off us, like the time I told you
about Eric coming over at us with his gun." Id. at 203, citing the District Court Trial Transcript, January
7, 1991 at 85-87. But see Williams, J., dissenting, Id. at 208-09 (arguing that nothing in Jefferson's
statement ties the gun to the drugs and that modem America includes gangs who attack each other for
reasons not related to drugs). The Jefferson opinion is also unusual in that the majority cites to Ice-T's
controversial rap song "Cop Killer". Id. at 208 (maj. opinion). The dissent argues that Jefferson's
situation may be more analogous to that of rapper Ice-Cube's character in the movie "Boyz 'n the 'Hood."
Id. at 209.
75. 857 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1988).
76. The facts in the appellate opinion are not clear regarding how close the closet was to the laundry
room, or whether there was a sufficient quantity of marijuana in the boot to support a federal possession
conviction.
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Robinson 'used' at least one of the firearms found in his house as a means
of safeguarding and facilitating illegal transactions and as an integral means
of protecting his possession of the [drugs]."I
The Fifth Circuit went to the far extreme of the "drug fortress" approach
in United States v. Molinar-Apodaca 78, where 142 pounds of marijuana
were found in a detached shed behind a house which contained an Uzi, a
semi-automatic handgun and ammunition for both weapons." 9 Citing Robinson, the Fifth Circuit held that the presence of the weapons and animunition
at the time when a considerable quantity of marijuana was seized on the
premises "compels the conclusion that the jury's verdict is supported by the
evidence." 8I
In this respect, the Fifth Circuit is the source of one of the more broad
applications of the drug fortress theory. In United States v. Beverly81, the
Fifth Circuit upheld a section 924(c)(1) conviction finding that each of four
co-defendants constructively "used" two revolvers locked in a safety deposit
box under a mattress in the bedroom of an apartment which served as a
cocaine distribution center.'
The Fifth Circuit court's holding was based upon the facts that (1) one
co-defendant was armed with a semi-automatic handgun while escorting a
federal informant to his car after completing a prior uncharged drug sale, and
also told an undercover federal agent seventeen days before his arrest that it
would "be like Vietnam around here" if someone tried to rip him off;8 and
(2) another co-defendant was found in the apartment at the time of arrest "in
possession of' $2,200 in cash, including $10 in money marked by the
government.' The appellate court found that the jury could "infer that these
specific guns were used as protection 'in relation to' both the ill-gained cash
and drugs found in the room."I
Applying the Second and Third Circuits' holdings to the facts of Beverly
highlights the irreconcilable nature of the split among the circuits in
construing the "uses" provision. Based on its decision in Feliz-Cordero,the
Second Circuit would likely be amused but not persuaded by a government
argument that the Beverly defendants "strategically" locked their weapons in
a safe deposit box to make them "quickly and easily available" 86 during
77. Id. at 1010.
78. 889 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1989).

79. Id. at 1422.
80. Id. at 1424 (emphasis added).
81. 921 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 561-63. One-half of a gram of cocaine was also found in the same bedroom as the guns.

83. Id. at 563. However, the informant could not pinpoint the exact date when the defendant allegedly

wore the gun while escorting him to his car. The "Vietnam" comparison was made on June 6, 1989; the
government searched the apartment pursuant to a warrant and found the weapons in question on June 23,

1989.
84. Id. Again, the appellate opinion clouds the facts by not explaining whether the defendant had actual

or constructive possession of the money.

85. Id.
86. United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 1988).
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their drug transactions. Nor would the circumstances which occurred
seventeen days (and more) before the arrest allow a Second Circuit jury to
presume the defendants' intent to use the firearms from the fact that the
weapons were found in the same room as one of the co-conspirators "during
the course of a search pursuant to a warrant."' Even the Second Circuit's
more expansive holding in Meggett s might not support a conviction of the
Beverly defendants-none of the Meggett weapons were in a locked room or
storage compartment.8 9
Likewise, the Third Circuit's Theodoropoulos opinion plainly suggests
that a weapon should be present in plain view if it is to be used to support
an inference that co-conspirators considered the weapon to be an integral part
of the conspiracy.' Further, the Beverly defendants also lacked the "easy
means of access" to weapons not in plain view which supported the section
924(c)(1) conviction upheld by the Third Circuit in Hill.9t
The Fifth Circuit's holding in United States v. Blake' further confirms
that mere constructive possession is more than enough for that court to
sustain a section 924(c)(1) conviction. Blake was convicted on one section
924(c)(1) count for a submachine gun found with 161 grams of crack cocaine
in the baseboard of his girlfriend's living room, and on another count for
four pistols found in a pillowcase in her bedroom.93 Again, the court cited
no circumstances showing that Blake intended to have the pistols available
for use during drug transactions, or that they were strategically located to be
easily available during such a transaction.'
The Fifth Circuit court merely held that "[evidence that the defendant]
admitted to owning the weapons and narcotics and to having been in the
apartment, and that he directed the police to the apartment's key and to the
weapons and drugs was more than sufficient to support the convictions on
[both] counts."95

87. Id.
88. 875 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. The Meggett weapons were found (1) behind a living room chair, (2) in the living room with the
"precise location unknown", and (3) in the bedroom in a nightstand drawer, dresser drawer and behind
the dresser. Id. at 26. Nevertheless, it is likely that the facts of Beverly are sufficiently analogous to those
of Jefferson to support a § 924(c)(1) conviction of the Beverly defendants if their case had been heard by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal.
90. 866 F.2d at 596-98.
91. 967 F.2d at 906. It is also questionable whether the Third Circuit would uphold the Beverly
convictions in light of its decision in United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
unloaded pistol in car trunk "used" because defendant had trunk key and bullet on his person at time of
arrest). The Beverly opinion does not indicate that the prosecution offered proof that any of the coconspirators possessed a key to the safety deposit box or had ammunition for the guns on their persons
at the time of their arrest.
92. 941 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 337.
94. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d at 254.
95. 941 F.2d at 343.
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3. The Sixth Circuit
A defendant seeking to overturn a section 924(c)(1) conviction before the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may not be able to reasonably predict the
likelihood of success. The court initially appeared to agree with the ready
access approach when it held that "'uses'

. .

. should be construed broadly

to cover the gamut of situations where drug traffickers have ready access to
weapons with which they secure or enforce their transactions." 96
In a later unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the
rationale of Feliz-Corderoand Theodoropoulosand confirmed its adoption of
the fortress theory:
In making [his] argument, Jackson cites United States v. Feliz-Cordero and
United States v. Theodoropoulos ....

This, however, has not been the

law of the Sixth Circuit. Our circuit, in 1989, expressly adopted the
fortress theory which provides that a defendant may be convicted under
section 924(c) when he keeps weapons in the house but does not use or
carry them at the time of the offense because "just as weapons are kept at
the ready to protect military installations against potential enemy attack, so
too may weapons be kept at the ready to protect a drug house, thereby
safeguarding and facilitating illegal transactions." As our circuit recently

endorsed the fortress theory, we should affirm the conviction under section
924(c).Y

The Sixth Circuit remained off the record when it endorsed the drug
fortress theory in 1992 in United States v. Mukes98 by revisiting its Jackson
discussion of the split between itself and the Second and Third Circuits.
However, after noting that Feliz-Cordero "is difficult to reconcile with our
circuit precedent, the court concluded that [i]nsofar as there is a conflict,...
and unless the Supreme Court or Congress should instruct us otherwise, we
must follow our own precedents."

99

III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES A
PERIPHERAL ISSUE IN CONSTRUING "USES"

In the summer of 1993, the Court peripherally addressed its responsibility to clarify the "uses" element of section 924(c)(1) in United States v.

96. United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
97. United States v. Jackson 1991 WL 11257, *2, *6 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished disposition), citing

United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 951-52 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899
(1989), and United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

98. 1992 WL 3713 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 361, reh'g denied
113 S. Ct. 833.
99. 1992 WL 3717 at *2.
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Smith.1°° John Angus Smith offered an undercover officer a MAC-10
machine gun and silencer in exchange for two ounces of cocaine. After
inspecting the weapon, the officer left Smith's motel under surveillance while
he arranged for Smith's arrest.' 0 Smith attempted to flee before the
officer returned to complete the gun-for-drugs transaction; after a high-speed
chase, a search of Smith's van incident to his arrest revealed a variety of
weapons, including the MAC-10 and its silencer. Smith was convicted in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on drug
trafficking and section 924(c)(1) counts."
Appealing his conviction before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal,
Smith relied on United States v. Phelps, 3 a 1989 Ninth Circuit case
holding that section 924(c)(1) did not apply to Phelps (who attempted to trade
a MAC-10 for a chemical necessary for the manufacture of an illegal drug)
because Phelps demonstrated no intention to use the firearm offensively-i.e.
"as a weapon would normally be used."'"
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the holding of Phelps, believing
that "the Phelps opinion's stress on a defendant's alleged intentions to use the
weapon offensively is incorrect."105 Citing a variety of cases where section
924(c)(1) convictions were upheld "despite the defendant's claim of nonbelligerent reasons for having the weapon,"105 the court affirmed Smith's
conviction, finding that "use may be established by evidence of possession
.. 'if possession is an integral part of and facilitates the commission of the
drug trafficking offense.' Furthermore, when drug purchasers trade guns for
drugs, the trade not only facilitates, but also becomes, an illegal drug
transaction. ""I
A. The Smith Majority Limited Its Opinion To The Facts Presented
Justice O'Connor began the majority opinion by setting forth an

100. 957 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1992), aff'd 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993) (6-3 decision; O'Connor, J.)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (Scalia, J., dissenting; joined by Stevens, J. and Souter, J.). The majority
opinion and dissent are considered herein; Justice Blackmun joins "the Court's opinion in full", based on
his understanding that the majority opinion does "not foreclose the possibility that the 'in relation to'
language of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) requires more than mere furtherance orfacilitation of a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime."

113 S. Ct. at 2060. Justice Blackmun's concern is noteworthy, as it may

indicate his predisposition to vote against the drug fortress theory if a case similar to those described in
this Comment reaches the Supreme Court.
101. 113 S. Ct. at 2052.

102. Id. at 2053. Smith was also caught with ammunition and a fast-feed mechanism for the MAC-10;
a MAC-I 1; a .45 caliber pistol; a .22 caliber pistol with homemade scope and silencer; and a 9 millimeter
handgun tucked in the waistband of his pants. Id.
103. 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989); reh'g denied en banc, 895 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1990).
104. Id. at 30.
105. 957 F.2d at 836.
106. Id. at 837. The cited cases include United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1989)

(where defendant claimed to be a gun collector); and United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th
Cir. 1989) (where defendant claimed gun was for protection against muggers). Meggettis discussed infra,
Part Il-A.

107. Id. (citations omitted).
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extremely narrow statement of the issue presented-"whether trading a
firearm for drugs can constitute 'use' of the firearm within the meaning of
section 924(c)(1)." 08 A few paragraphs later, she again reinforced the
limited nature of the Court's review: "the only question in this case is
whether the phrase 'uses ...

a firearm' in section 924(c)(1) is most reason-

ably read as excluding the use of a firearm in a gun-for-drugs trade." 0 9
Within this extremely limited context, Justice O'Connor first construed
"use" in accordance with its "ordinary or natural meaning,""1 and held
that Smith's: "handling of the MAC-10 in this case falls squarely within
those definitions": "By attempting to trade his MAC-10 for the drugs, he
'used' or 'employed' it as an item of barter to obtain cocaine; he 'derived
service' from it because it was going to bring him the very drugs he
sought.""' After addressing the similar arguments raised by the petitioner
and Justice Scalia's dissent," 2 the Court analyzed subsection (c)(1) within
the context of another provision of the statute" 3 providing for mandatory
forfeiture of firearms. Citing the tenet of construction that "a single word
cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute, "14
Justice O'Connor noted that four of the six subsections of section 924(d)(3)
penalize offenses which do not involve "the bellicose use of a firearm":115
The evident care with which Congress chose the language of section
924(d)(1) reinforces our conclusion ... [Congress] carefully varied the

statutory language in accordance with the guns' relation to the offense.
For example, with respect to some crimes, the firearm is subject to
forfeiture not only if it is "used" but also if it is "involved in" the offense.
Examination of the offenses to which the "involved in" language applies
reveals why Congress believed it is necessary to include such an expansive
term . . . [For example], [b]ecause making a material misstatement in

order to acquire or sell a gun is not "use" of the gun even under the
broadest definition of the word "use," Congress carefully expanded the
108. 113 S. Ct at 2054.
109. Id. at 2055.

110. Id. at 2054. The Court cites these authorities to support its interpretation of "use": WEBSTER'S
2806 (2d ed. 1949) ("to convert to one's

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE

service"/"to employ"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990) ("to avail oneself of"/"to carry

out a purpose or action by means of"); and Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884) ("to derive service

from").
111. Id.

112. Discussed infra part Im.B.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(3) (West Supp. 1993).

114. 113 S. Ct. at 2056.
115. Id. at 2057. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(3)(A) and (d)(3)(B) set forth the only two circumstances where

subject weapons might be used as offensive weapons, i.e. in a crime of violence or drug trafficking
offense. The other § 924(d)(3) offenses involve use of a firearm as an item in commerce, i.e if intended
to be "used" in an interstate transfer/sale/trade/giftltransportl delivery of another prohibited firearm where
there is a pattern of such activity (subsection C); if transferred or sold to disqualified persons such as
fugitives or felons (subsection D); if intended to be used in shipping or receipt of stolen firearms, or by
a felon, or with intent to commit a felony (subsection E); and if intended to be used in an federally

prosecutable offense which involves exportation of firearms (subsection F). 18 U.S.C § 924(d)(3) (West
Supp. 1993).
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statutory language. As a result, a gun with respect to which a material
misstatement is made is subject to forfeiture because, even though the gun
is not "used" in the offense, it is "involved in" it. Congress, however, did
not so expand the languagefor offenses in whichfirearms were "intended
to be used", even though the firearms in many of those offenses function
as items of commerce rather than as weapons... In light of the common
meaning of the word "use" and the structure
and language of the statute,
6
we are not in any position to disagree.1
The language emphasized above suggests that the six JusticesH7 who
joined the majority would have difficulty accepting either the drug fortress
or the ready access approach. Both rationales permit a section 924(c)(1)
conviction if the government can prove that the subject firearm was intended
to be used. The only distinction is that the drug fortress circuits see intent
to use as actual use and thus permit inference of use from mere presence or
possession of a firearm, while the ready access courts require a showing of
strategic location and ready accessibility if intent to use is to be inferred from
presence or possession.
Nevertheless, neither the carefully confined statement of the issue in the
Supreme Court's review of Smith v. United States, nor the majority's passing
comment regarding offenses in which firearms are "intended to be used",
guide lower federal courts in applying section 924(c)(1) in a case where there
is no affirmative act on the defendant's part which evidences her intent to
derive service from a firearm.
B. The Dissent Points Out a LargerInterpretationProblem
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia begins his dissent by honing in on "a
'fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed of language
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must
be drawn from the context in which it is used."'"
He reaches the intermediate conclusion that "[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use
it for its intended purpose, '""' and concludes:
The ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm" does not include using it as an
article of commerce. I think it perfectly obvious, for example, that the
objective falsity requirement for a perjury conviction would not be satisfied
if a witness answered "no" to a prosecutor's inquiry whether he had ever
"used a firearm," even though he had once sold his grandfather's Enfield
rifle to a collector2 . . . [I]t seems to me inconsequential that "the words
'as a weapon' appear nowhere in the statute," they are reasonably implicit
[W]hen, in section 924(c)(1), the phrase "uses ...a firearm" is not
employed in a context that necessarily envisions the unusual 'use' of a
116. 113 S. Ct. at 2057 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
117. However, only five of the six remain on the Court after Justice White's 1993 retirement.
118. 113 S.Ct. at 2060-61 (citing Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993, 1996 (1993)).
119. Id. at 2061.

120. Id. at n.1.
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firearm as a commodity, the normally understood meaning of the phrase
should prevail.121
In making this argument, Justice Scalia appears to be in agreement with
the majority's view that "the meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if
viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in light of
the terms that surround it."'" However, Justice Scalia misses the mark by
arguing that the word "uses" has a reduced scope in section 924(c)(1)
because it appears alongside the word "firearm."'1
The "surrounding term" which would appear to be most probative of the
meaning of "use" is "during and in relation to." The use of the word "and"
seems to indicate that the legislature viewed a drug trafficking offense as an
event of limited duration with a fixed beginning and end. Thus, a weapon
would have to be "used" (i) at a point in the course of' 24 a specific drug
trafficking activity, and (ii) in relation to that activity. However, both the
ready access and drug fortress approaches seem to view drug trafficking as
an event of infinite duration (perhaps the activity only ends when the
perpetrator is finally arrested). Neither approach requires the government
to specify a finite time frame within the drug trafficking activity when the
weapon was allegedly "used" by the defendant. Following Justice Scalia's
thesis, both ready access and drug fortress courts misconstrue the second
element of the statute as meaning "during or in relation to" drug trafficking
activity.
In this light, Justice Scalia's dissent suggests not only that Smith does
nothing to resolve the conflict in construing the "uses" element of section
924(c)(1), but that all of the circuits have erroneously construed the "during
and in relation to" element as well.
IV. PROPOSAL

Due to its extremely limited scope, Smith should not be viewed as

resolving the conflict among the federal circuits with respect to how "uses"

must be construed in prosecutions which do not involve an exchange of firearms for drugs. In fact, as illustrated above, the reasoning applied by both

the majority and dissenters in Smith suggest that neither the ready access nor
the drug fortress approaches currently in use would survive Supreme Court

scrutiny.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 2062 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2054.
Id.
WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 351 (1980).
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A. An Appeal For Supreme Court Certiorari:
Smith Has Not Resolved The Conflict
A petition for a writ of certiorari will only be granted if there are
"special and important reasons" for the Supreme Court to exercise its power
of supervision. Though a review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, the Court does have the discretion to grant certiorari "when a United
States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another United States court of appeals on the same matter."" 5 In fact,
the Court itself has said that a principal purpose for use of its certiorari
jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts among the Circuit Courts of Appeals
concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law. Although Congress can
eliminate a conflict concerning a statutory provision by amending the statute,
the Court
regards the task of clarifying federal law "as initially and primarily
12
ours. " 6

This Comment's brief survey of the philosophical differences between
"ready access" circuits and "drug fortress" circuits gives greater weight to
the arguments of petitioners seeking Supreme Court review of section
924(c)(1) convictions. By carefully and explicitly limiting the scope of its
opinion in Smith, 7 the Supreme Court sidestepped its responsibility to
bring closure to the issue of how "uses" should be construed in section
924(c)(1) cases which do not involve a trade or attempted trade of firearms
for drugs, or any other affirmative act by the defendant which evidences his
intent to use or carry the subject firearm during or in relation to a drug
trafficking activity.
Clearly, over the past seven years, cases raising the issue of how the
"uses" element of section 924(c)(1) should be construed have frequently
arisen. And, the conflict among the circuits "shows no signs of abating. 'n
Indeed, though unpublished, the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Mukes" 9 should
be viewed as an acknowledgment of the existence of a dispute which requires
the intervention of the nation's highest court, as well as a possible signal of
that circuit's discomfort with its own precedent.
B. In the Absence of Legislative Intent to the Contrary,
The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Ready Access Approach
In choosing an appropriate standard for construing section 924(c)(1), the
Court only needs to follow the most fundamental rule of statutory construction. When the "resolution of a question of federal law turns on a
statute and the intention of Congress, [the federal courts must] look first to
125. Sup. Ct. Rep. 10.

126. Braxton v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 1857 (1991).
127. Discussed supra Part II.
128. Langston v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 361, 362 (1992) (White, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 98 and Part II.B.3.
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the statutory language, and then to the legislative history if the statutory
language
is unclear" or supports an interpretation which defies common
1 30
sense.
In section 924(c)(1) cases, binding federal courts to the plain meaning
of use creates no conflict with the dictates of common understanding. "Use"
is "that enjoyment of property which consists in its employment, occupation,
exercise or practice."' 3 ' Rather than focusing on a presumed relationship
between all weapons and drug trafficking activities, it is more consistent with
the word's plain meaning to focus on whether there is "a concrete showing ' 32 that a section 924(c)(1) defendant intentionally positioned himself
a weapon, and drugs or drug implements in such a manner as to enable
himself to exercise dominoin and control over both at the same time.
Inferences drawn from the limited legislative history of the statute
support a plain meaning approach. "It is important to note that Congress did
not make it a crime to possess a gun with the intent to use it in relation to a
drug trafficking crime."'3 3 In the absence of amendments or a clear
legislative history to the contrary, section 924(c)(1) only makes it34a crime to
affirmatively use a gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense.'
In allowing section 924(c)(1) convictions in situations where "an
operable [or inoperable] firearm is found in close proximity to a room or
rooms in which drug distribution, processing or storage occurs", 35 the
drug fortress approach focuses solely on the fact-finders perceptions of
relationships between objects, but not between objects and people. In drug
fortress circuits, defendants prosecuted under section 924(c)(1) are being
convicted and receiving long-term mandatory sentences based on the
establishment of a nexus between weapons to drugs or implements of the
drug trade, but not to the person who must exercise dominion and control
over the weapons in order for them to be enjoyed, employed, occupied,
exercised or practiced. In effect, drug fortress circuits have reached the
comfortable conclusion that "people don't use guns and drugs-drugs use
guns and people."
This approach provides no readily identifiable standards for fact-finders,
because the drug fortress circuits have in effect created a novel theory of law
which suggests that drugs, money or physical premises are capable of
"possessing" and/or "using" weapons that may be available for their
protection, and that these inanimate objects exercise some sort of inherent
pernicious control over the individuals who must themselves control the

130. United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1990), citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 896 (1984).
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983). See also WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1279 (1980).
132. 915 F.2d at 225.
133. United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 889 (10th Cir. 1992).
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weapons if the weapons are to be "used."
Although "[t]he point at which conduct becomes unlawful should be a
question for the jury", every criminal statute should contain readily identifiable standards which mandate the minimum level of culpability which the
prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction.136 A jury may be entitled
"to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from [proffered] evidence, but
[it] may not base a verdict on mere speculation."' 37 Because it forces fact
finders to speculate regarding whether the defendant intentionally positioned
firearms and drugs in a manner that would create a relationship between the
two inanimate items, the drug fortress theory is deficient in its ability to
provide consistently identifiable standards for determining "use" under
section 924(c)(1).
V. CONCLUSION

The circuit courts of appeal should establish readily identifiable standards
for finders of fact in the lower federal courts. In section 924(c)(1)
prosecutions, the government should be required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was a proximate relationship between the
defendant's control over and extraction of service from each weapon cited
in his indictment and the drug-related activity (be it actual possession,
inchoate possession or trafficking) which forms the predicate offense.
The happenstance presence of firearms and drugs at the same time and
in the same place, without more, does not support a conviction under the
current version of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1), just as the mere presence of a gun
in the pocket of a person engaged in hand-to-hand physical violence would
not provide grounds for a conviction under the pre-1986 version of the
statute.' In this light, the drug fortress approach is inconsistent with the
legislative history of section 924(c)(1), as well as with the plain meaning of
"use" and traditional notions of the law as it relates to possessory interests
and determinations of individual culpability.
The drug fortress and ready access rationales are incompatible by nature,
the drug fortress analysis is bad law, and the time has come for the
intervention of the United States Supreme Court to adopt the ready access
doctrine as the standard for section 924(c)(1) prosecutions.
JamillaA. Moore"

136. Matthew T. Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 207: 7he Needfor a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements ofFederalCriminalLaw, 65 NoTE

DAME L. REV. 803, 821-22 (1990) (arguing, inter alia, that "conduct elements" in a criminal statute
should require a knowledge mens rea to give greater predictability and certainty to statutory interpretation).

137. United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
138. Crime Control Act, supra note 21, at 3491.
* The author greatly appreciates the constructive criticism and encouragement provided by
Professors Daniel B. Yeager and Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., and editors Angelo Ciavarella,
Matthew Siea, Sharon P. Spivak, and Gregory Hansen.
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